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Introduction: The Varieties of Enactivism 
 
Just over 25 years ago, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch published The 
Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (TEM). An ambitious synthesis of 
ideas from phenomenology, cognitive science, evolutionary biology, Buddhist philosophy 
and psychology, it attempted to articulate a new research programme: an enactive cognitive 
science, that would bridge the gap between the empirical study of the mind and the 
disciplined reflection on our lived experience that characterises phenomenological and 
Buddhist practices. This enactive approach to the study of mind represented a confluence of 
several streams of thought whose effect on the cognitive scientific landscape was becoming 
gradually more pronounced. A vision of cognition as active, embodied, and embedded was 
beginning to crystalise, and TEM consolidated and further strengthened existing trends. In 
the intervening years, the theoretical currents that flowed into TEM have only grown 
stronger within cognitive science and philosophy of mind. As a result, the ‘enactivist’ label 
has gained in currency, as different combinations of TEM’s main conceptual ingredients 
have been concocted and presented by different researchers. A consequence of this is the 
apparent existence of a variety of distinct but overlapping ‘enactivisms’, the relations 
between which are not always clear. This special issue aims to provide a clearer picture of 
the enactivist theoretical landscape, some of its distinctive landmarks, and the disputed 
borders between its main provinces. Each of the papers in this issue takes up and pursues a 
live theoretical issue for enactivist research, while at the same time shedding light on the 
conceptual geography of enactivism. In this introduction, we frame these contributions by 
providing a brief sketch of the streams of thought that flowed into TEM and the origins of 
enactivism, and the main theoretical channels that have emerged from it. 
 
1. Ancestors 
 
Potted histories of any subject area – especially one as young as cognitive science – are 
inevitably partial and biased. Nonetheless, considering how a relevant chunk of intellectual 
history appears from a particular perspective helps in understanding that perspective and its 
motivations. The following account of the recent history of cognitive science from the 
perspective of enactivism thus makes no claims to completeness or objectivity. However, as 
we will see, understanding the ways in which different groups of theorists have combined 
the ingredients below is helpful in understanding the varieties of enactivism. 
 
Work on TEM began in the mid-80s, against the backdrop of the then-dominant cognitivist 
paradigm in cognitive science.1 Cognitivism attempted to understand intelligence in terms 
of the production, transformation and manipulation of inner states that represented 
properties of the domain that the cognizer was trying to deal with. Its guiding image was 
the mind as computer. From the mid-20th century, the cleverest objects whose workings we 
could understand were computers – systems that took in impoverished inputs from their 
environment (via key-presses or other simple sensors), went through a complex sequence of 
structured inner states whose unfolding was governed by well-specified algorithms and 
principles, and produced some output appropriate to the task for which it had been 
programmed. We humans can also do some pretty clever things, and we know that a 
staggeringly complex web of internal states intervenes between our perception of the 
environment and our intelligent response to it. Understanding our cognitive capacities as 
                                                     
1 See the introduction to, and the papers collected in Haugeland (ed.) (1981) for an overview 
of classical cognitivism, some of its theoretical highlights, and its early challenges. See 
Thompson (2004) for an account of the origins of TEM. 
those of particularly fancy, biologically realised, computational systems seemed (and still 
seems) like a good bet. 
 
However, despite its theoretical fertility and impressive array of early successes, the 
cognitivist paradigm faced problems. Cognitivists struggled to model or explain the 
flexible, context-sensitive and domain-general intelligence that is characteristic of human 
cognition. Intuitively basic cognitive capacities like motor control and perceptual 
recognition seemed particularly resistant to cognitivist efforts. And, among philosophers, 
there was a lack of theoretical consensus over the best account of the notion of 
‘representation’ at the heart of cognitivism. By the time of the publication of TEM the 
challenges faced by the cognitivist view were beginning to look more like permanent and 
insuperable obstacles than the teething problems of a new paradigm. At the same time, 
several apparently distinct strands of cognitive-scientific theorising were yielding models, 
explanations and results that looked at odds with the cognitivist framework.  
 
Work on connectionist neural networks2 suggested that computational explanations of 
intelligent behaviour needn’t appeal to the serial production and manipulation of discrete 
representational states; instead, adaptive behaviour can emerge out of a the activity of a 
densely interconnected web of interacting units. Importantly, the patterns of connectivity 
that specify the structure of a connectionist network need not be rigid or pre-specified. 
Instead, connectionist networks can be self-organising systems; the structure that underlies 
their intelligent behaviour can emerge as a result of a network’s learning and interactive 
history. Connectionist models had notable success with domains that troubled cognitivists, 
such as pattern recognition and sensorimotor control. A closely related emerging theme 
was the use of tools from dynamical systems theory (DST) in characterising cognitive 
organisation.3 DST provides formal and conceptual apparatus for describing the unfolding 
operations of complex systems composed of multiple closely interacting parts – including 
self-organising systems like (some) connectionist networks. The language of DST 
characterises systems in terms of a multidimensional space of possible states the system can 
be in, equations that describe the ways in which the system can transition from one point in 
state space to another, and theoretically significant points in that space such as attractors – 
stable states to which a system’s activity will often tend. Of special relevance to the 
historical narrative we’re constructing here is the fact that these characterisations eschew 
talk of discrete, static representations in favour of a global description of the state of a 
system and its activity. 
 
At the same time as these trends, work in the tradition of ecological psychology suggested a 
complementary set of reactions to cognitivism.4 According to Gibson’s (1979) ecological 
                                                     
2 See Clark (1989, 1993) for surveys of connectionism’s origins and early successes, and its 
contrasts with cognitivism. 
3 See e.g. Horgan and Tienson (1992) for an early statement of the relevance of dynamical 
systems theory for philosophy of cognitive science, and Clark (1997) for a philosophical 
survey and critical assessment of dynamical systems approaches to cognition. 
4 See Gibson (1979) for the locus classicus of ecological psychology, and Chemero (2011) for 
a contemporary summary and defense. We don’t mean to suggest here that Gibsonian 
psychology was a central inspiration of TEM itself – Varela, Thompson and Rosch take care 
to point out the differences between their view and Gibson’s (1993, pp.203-4). Varela’s 
earlier work with Maturana (e.g. Maturana and Varela 1970; see also Varela 1996) and the 
phenomenological currents discussed below are more important theoretical antecedents of 
the relational view of cognition developed in TEM. 
psychology, visual perception of the environment is direct in that it should not be 
understood in terms of representational or computational states that reconstruct 
environmental information that is lost in sensory transduction. Part of the reason that such 
states are not required is that perception is active in at least two ways. First, since the 
environment’s sensory effects on us unfold over time, and can be modulated by our own 
activity (squinting, looking more closely, moving around), a conception of visual perception 
as the recovery of detailed information from a static and impoverished perceptual stimulus 
underestimates the resources available to our perceptual systems. Second, what we perceive 
is tied to our purposes and capacities. We perceive affordances – opportunities to engage 
with the environment in ways that reflect our needs and plans – rather than practically 
neutral information that our perceptual systems must interpret and put in touch with our 
capacities for action. Finally, this active, direct conception of perception goes along with a 
conception of perceiver and environment as a co-defined and co-dependent. A perceiver’s 
environment is just that set of features which can perceptually guide its ongoing activities. 
And to be a perceiver is to be the sort of creature that can be so guided by the environment. 
 
A final related area of empirical enquiry that was gaining momentum during the gestation 
of TEM was work on situated robotics.5 As noted above, successful cognitivist models often 
exhibited only brittle and domain-specific capacities for intelligent response, and struggled 
in particular with adaptive sensorimotor control. MIT roboticist Rodney Brooks noted that 
these limitations were also reflected in cognitivist AI, with the most sophisticated extant 
robots failing to approximate the ecologically robust sensorimotor intelligence of simple 
insects. Setting out to remedy this, Brooks (1991) engineered and built a series of robots (or 
‘Creatures’) designed to flexibly produce a range of simple adaptive behaviours in 
interaction with real environments. Instead of designing according to cognitivist principles 
– with behaviour guided by producing and continuously updating detailed representations 
of the target environment – Brooks’ robots consisted of a number of special purpose 
subsystems, most of which guided a simple sensorimotor behaviour. Rather than having 
each subsystem feed in to a central processor that would calculate and command a single 
course of action for the robot, the subsystems were interconnected such that the activity of 
each one could inhibit the activity of others, in ways that could be easily tweaked and 
manipulated by the engineers. Thus, summarises Brooks: 
 
Just as there is no central representation there is not even a central system. Each 
activity producing layer connects perception to action directly. It is only the 
observer of the Creature who imputes a central representation or central control. 
The Creature itself has none; it is a collection of competing behaviors. Out of the 
local chaos of their interactions there emerges, in the eye of an observer, a coherent 
pattern of behavior. (1991, pp.148-149) 
 
Brooks’ Creatures could indeed produce coherent, adaptive behaviours. Most famously, 
‘Herbert’ (named after cogsci pioneer and polymath Herb Simon) could trundle around the 
MIT labs, scanning surfaces for empty coke cans, which it would pick up and transport to a 
bin. Brooks’ Creatures provided an existence proof that simple modes of intelligence could 
be engineered by way of multiple interacting sensorimotor capacities, without recourse to a 
detailed model of the environment as a locus of central control. Instead, Brooks designed his 
Creatures to use the world as its own best model, emphasising the capacity to quickly and 
                                                     
5 The classic example is Brooks (1991). Brooks’ work is discussed as an illustrative case of 
enactive cognitive science in TEM pp.207-212. See Pfeifer and Bongard (2007) for a more 
recent overview. 
reliably access behaviourally-relevant information in the world over the capacity to 
reconstruct that information internally. 
 
Lastly, the split between proponents of cognitivism and those tempted by the alternative 
research programmes sketched above appeared symptomatic of deeper philosophical 
divisions. The theoretical appeal of cognitivism can partly be traced back to Frege’s 
demonstration that a broad class of logical inferences – the sorts of things that minds 
appear to traffic in – can be specified in terms of formal rules for manipulating syntactical 
structures, and Turing’s demonstration that any set of such rules can be implemented and 
followed by a machine. Against this backdrop, cognitivists could busy themselves 
identifying the relevant syntactic structures, the rules for manipulating them, and the 
engineering principles according to which these structures and rules were implemented in 
the human brain. The origins of cognitivism thus overlap with those of a central strand of 
‘analytic philosophy’ – the construal of thought in terms of formal transitions between 
propositions, and the construal of minds as fundamentally seats of propositional attitudes. 
The work of several Phenomenologists, however, suggested an alternative to this background 
conception of mindedness.6 For example, Heidegger (1927/1962) is often read as arguing 
that a thinker’s capacity to explicitly represent elements of her environment (as in a 
propositional attitude) depends on a prior capacity to skilfully interact with the 
environment in ways that are already subject to normative constraints. The capacity to 
think of a hammer as too heavy for this particular job depends on a prior capacity to 
hammer, and a prior sense of what it’s like for hammering to be going well or badly. 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012) likewise argues that the capacity to stand in a meaningful 
cognitive relationship to the environment depends on a suite of capacities for bodily 
interaction, with this dependence resulting in the particular details of our embodiment 
making crucial contributions to the structure of thought and experience. Hubert Dreyfus 
(1972, 2007) argued influentially that cognitivism’s limits had been accurately predicted by 
phenomenological critiques of empiricist and rationalist psychology, and these remarks 
looked increasingly prescient as cognitivism struggled to model the kinds of flexible, active 
and engaged intelligence emphasised by Phenomenologists. 
 
All these ideas were in the air while the first enactivist manifesto was being developed. 
Against cognitivism’s explanatory emphasis on the construction and manipulation of 
representations that were discrete and internal, each of these trends emphasised in different 
ways the explanatory power of interaction with the cognizer’s environment, and the 
importance of external or implementational factors. As we’ve seen, these can include 
properties of the cognizer’s body, its environment, or the dynamics of the interactions 
between these factors. 
 
2. The Embodied Mind 
 
The enactive approach introduced in The Embodied Mind drew on each of the above strands in 
varying degrees, and outlined a unifying explanatory framework that combined them with 
concepts from systems biology and Buddhist practices. In an initial definition of enactivism, 
the authors tell us: 
 
                                                     
6 The two most influential works in this connection are Heidegger (1926/1962) and 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012). See Dreyfus (1972, 2007) and Haugeland (1979, 2012) for 
canonical applications of arguments from these sources to cognitive science. See Kaufer and 
Chemero (2015) and Gallagher and Zahavi (2013) for recent overviews of the relationship 
between phenomenology and cognitive science. 
‘In a nutshell, the enactive approach consists of two points: (1) perception consists in 
perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent 
sensorimotor patterns that allow action to be perceptually guided.’ (TEM, p.173) 
 
For the purposes of understanding TEM’s enactivism, this second point takes priority. For 
cognitivism, as sketched above, the cognitive structures of interest are internal states which 
represent determinate properties of the environment that are absent or imperfectly 
accessed. Enactivism instead emphasises emergent cognitive structures that self-organise as a 
result of interactions between organism and environment. The clearest and best-known 
example of this doesn’t feature in TEM, but is a key ingredient of enactivism’s conceptual 
history. Consider the organisation of a single cell bacterium (Varela 1997). The bacterium is 
separated from the molecular soup that surrounds it by a semi-permeable boundary that is 
both created and maintained by a network of processes (absorbing nutrients, expelling 
waste products) that criss-cross the organism/environment boundary. The bacterium is 
thus an autopoietic system – one that ‘generates and specifies its own organization through 
its operation as a system of production of its own components’ (Maturana and Varela 1980, 
p.79). In this way, a biological unity emerges from a nexus of interactions with portions of 
its environment. The details of these interactions – their distinctive dynamics – matters, 
especially insofar as they bear on the particular way in which the organism is embodied. 
This is because details of an organism’s embodiment determine structures and properties in 
the environment that bear on the organism’s flourishing. In the case of bacteria, for 
example: 
 
although sucrose is a real and present condition of the physicochemical environment, 
its status as food is not. That sucrose is a nutrient is not intrinsic to the status of the 
sucrose molecule; it is, rather a relational feature, linked to the bacterium’s 
metabolism. Sucrose has significance or value as food, but only in the milieu that the 
organism itself brings into existence. (Thompson 2007, p.158) 
 
The enactive approach outlined in TEM thus entails that both the organism and the 
meaningful structures in its environment emerge from a set of self-organising dynamic 
processes. These environmental structures are meaningful insofar as they bear on the 
organism’s success or failure in keeping itself around as an autopoietic unity, and in that 
sense have significance for the organism’s existence. And it is in virtue of this significance 
that the enactivist counts the structures brought about by such interactions as cognitive. 
Whereas the cognitivist holds that significance (or meaning) is bestowed by the organism 
representing environmental structures in the service of adaptive behaviour, TEM argues that 
significance is enacted as part of a dynamical process that creates and sustains both the 
organism and the environment to which it is responding – the adaptive behaviour emerges 
from, and is sustained by, a set of dynamic interactions that itself gives rise to the 
organism/environment distinction. 
 
It is this view of the co-production of cognizer and environment through dynamic 
interaction that accounts for TEM’s view of perception as perceptually guided action. 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch claim Brooks’ Creatures as an illustrative example of enactive 
cognitive science (TEM pp.207-212) in virtue of Brooks’ emphasis on coupled 
environmental interaction over the construction of detailed internal representations. 
Likewise, the affinities between TEM’s enactivism and Gibson’s ecological approach are 
clear – there is both a shared emphasis on organism and environment as co-dependent, and 
on the organism’s capacity for direct interaction with structures that bear on the success of 
its activities.7 For Gibson, perception is not a process of passive reception of information 
that is built up into a representation of a meaningful environment, but direct sensitivity – 
often made possible by exploratory activity – to properties of the environment that are 
already action-relevant. TEM agrees with this Gibsonian picture, but adds a specific vision 
of the coupled relationship that makes such direct perception possible. As we’ll see below, 
the link between perception and perceptually-guided action is taken up in various ways by 
subsequent enactivist theorists. 
 
TEM’s emphasis on engaged activity over detached representation, and the way in which 
details of embodiment determine details of cognitive relations to the environment, are two 
points of contact with the Phenemomenological tradition sketched above. Another is its 
rejection of a strictly realist or objectivist conception of the world to which we respond in 
perception, in favour of a conception of the world as both a product and reflection of our 
engaged activity. The agenda of TEM is announced at the outset as ‘a modern continuation 
of a programme of research founded over a generation ago by the French philosopher, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’ (p.xv), and follows Merleau-Ponty in aiming for a middle ground 
between realist and idealist conceptions of the relationship between mind and world. 
However, TEM also expresses scepticism about the scope of phenomenological philosophy, 
worrying that it consists in detached post-hoc theorising that might distort the experiences 
it aims to analyse. In response, TEM argues that Buddhist meditation and mindfulness 
practices should be integrated into an enactive cognitive science: ‘mindfulness techniques 
are designed to lead the mind back from its theories and preoccupations, back from the 
abstract attitude, to the situation of one’s experience itself’ (p.22). Much of TEM consists in 
putting insights from Buddhist traditions into contact with the conceptual apparatus and 
analyses of enactivism.8 
 
All this allows us to see why Varela, Thompson and Rosch begin TEM by saying: 
 
‘This book begins and ends with the conviction that the new sciences of mind need 
to enlarge their horizon to encompass both lived human experience and the 
possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience. Ordinary, everyday 
experience, on the other hand, must enlarge its horizon to benefit from the insights 
and analyses that are distinctly wrought by the sciences of mind.’ (p.xv) 
 
Enactivism’s mission, as outlined in TEM, is to explore the ways in which cognitive science 
and human experience reciprocally inform each other. The authors’ key claim is that the 
various cognitive scientific trends surveyed above and synthesised in TEM support a vision 
                                                     
7 In TEM (pp.203-4) the authors distinguish their position from Gibson’s by arguing that 
Gibson understands environmental structures as objective, pre-specified properties to which 
the organism must respond, in contrast to enactivism’s emphasis on organism and 
environmental properties as simultaneously enacted. Adjudicating this dispute would take 
us too far into Gibson-exegesis for our purposes here – but the claim that TEM places 
greater emphasis on organism/environment co-dependence than Gibson looks well-
founded. Likewise, TEM goes beyond Gibson in its particular conception of the interactive 
dynamics underlying this co-dependence. 
8 Whilst the interaction between enactivism and Buddhist practices has not been an 
influential theme in the other varieties of enactivism we will survey here, it continues to be 
reflected in Evan Thompson’s recent work (e.g. 2014). See Thompson’s Preface to the new 
edition of TEM for some important qualifications about his current attitude to the 
relationship between Phenomenological and Buddhist traditions.  
of mind as emergent, embodied and engaged that was glimpsed by phenomenologists such 
as Merleau-Ponty, and articulated and made central in many Buddhist traditions. This 
convergence should encourage us to prefer enactivist cognitive science to its cognitivist 
precursors, and to transform our self-understanding through engaging in mindfulness 
practices that corroborate these discoveries. 
 
3. Descendents 
 
Since TEM’s publication there have been at least three semi-distinct currents of enactivist 
theorising. First, what is sometimes called autopoietic enactivism, which emphasises TEM’s 
project of grounding cognition in the biodynamics of living systems; second, sensorimotor 
enactivism, which focuses on analysing the structure, content and character of perceptual 
experience in terms of the relationships between sensation and embodied activity; third, 
radical enactivism, which focuses on the case for rejecting representationalist explanations of 
cognitive capacities in favour of explanatory strategies emphasising patterns of embodied 
interaction. Finally, enactivist theorising overlaps with various attempts to understand minds 
as embodied, embedded, extended and affective that draw on the traditions sketched in section 
1, while rejecting or remaining neutral on particular enactivist tenets. 
 
3.1 Autopoietic Enactivism 
Perhaps surprisingly, the term ‘autopoeisis’ is not mentioned in TEM. Instead, the closely 
related notion of autonomy is emphasised – the way in which the self-sustaining biodynamics 
of autopoietic systems create both a distinction between an organism and its environment, 
and a domain of interactions that bear on the organism’s prospects for survival. The 
‘autopoietic’ strand of enactivist theorising emphasises and develops this attempt to ground 
cognition in the biodynamics of living systems.9 In holding that cognition is grounded in 
the dynamics of biological life itself, autopoietic enactivists incur a commitment to the strong 
continuity of life and mind - the view that the organisational structures and principles 
distinctive of mind are simply enriched versions of the structures and principles grounding 
life itself. As we saw above, autopoietic enactivists hold that simple sensorimotor 
interactions between organism and environment bring with them a form of teleological 
directedness to the environment (as when the bacterium’s activity aims at the sucrose-rich 
portions of its environment) and significance or value in the organism’s environment (as 
when the chemical composition of the bacterium’s environment becomes good for the 
bacterium in virtue of the dynamics of its embodiment). This process of enacting cognitive 
structures is sometimes called sense-making by autopoietic enactivists.10 
 
One source of difference within autopoietic enactivist views is the particular conception of 
the biodynamics required for cognitive organisation. Whereas TEM emphasises the 
dynamics of autonomy, Di Paolo (2005) influentially proposed that genuine cognition 
requires a capacity on the part of the organism to actively modify its relationship to the 
                                                     
9 Key works include Varela (1996), Weber and Varela (2002), Di Paolo (2005), Thompson 
(2007). Given the fact that TEM emphasises autonomous rather than autopoietic 
organisation, ‘Autopoietic enactivism’ is perhaps an imperfect term for this branch of 
enactivist theory. Nonetheless, labelling forms of enactivism that emphasise biodynamics in 
this way has become commonplace (see e.g. Degenaar & O’Regan, Hutto and Wheeler’s 
contributions to this issue; see Barandiaran’s contribution for a reconstruction of enactivism 
emphasising autonomy). 
10 See in particular Weber and Varela (2002), Thompson and Stapleton (2009) and 
Thompson and Di Paolo (2014) 
environment in ways that help it to persist as an autopoietic unity (as when, for example, 
the bacterium moves its flagella in a way that propels it towards the sucrose-rich area). Both 
this capacity, and the dynamics through which it is realised, are called adaptivity by Di Paolo 
and subsequent enactivists. Barandiaran’s contribution to this issue takes up this debate, 
arguing that autonomous organisation is the mark of cognitive systems, and offering an 
improved conception of autonomy that makes its foundational role clear, and is 
complemented by ongoing work in simulated robotics.  
 
Another distinctive feature of much contemporary autopoietic enactivism is the way in 
which the deep continuity of life and mind is argued for. Whereas TEM implies that the 
dynamics of autonomous organisation straightforwardly entail a teleological relationship 
between organism and environment that marks the beginnings of mindedness, Weber and 
Varela (2002) argue that the continuity of life and mind is first and foremost 
phenomenologically evident to us, and that this phenomenological evidence is what ultimately 
grounds the enactivist attempt to explain cognition in terms of biodynamics. In this they 
are partly inspired by  the phenomenologist Hans Jonas (1966) and his dictum that ‘life can 
only be known by life’. In line with TEM, Jonas understood the dynamics of metabolic 
processes as bringing about autonomous entities that stood in teleological relations to their 
environments. But, in considering how a teleological relationship can be inferred from 
metabolic dynamics, Jonas asks: 
 
“But what kind of inference is this? And by whom? How can the unprepared 
observer infer what no mere analysis of the physical record will ever yield? The 
unprepared observer cannot… The observer of life must be prepared by life. In other 
words, organic existence with its own experience is required of himself for his being 
able to make that inference.” (Jonas 1966, p.82) 
 
This ‘Jonasian inference’ from our own lived experience to the deep continuity of life and 
mind plays an important role in much contemporary autopoietic enactivism.11 Barrett’s 
contribution to this special issue critically examines the way in which normative concepts 
like concern and flourishing have been introduced into autopoietic enactivism, arguing that 
the various kinds of organisational dynamics in which enactivists attempt to ground the 
normative properties of cognition entail only proscriptive normativity - they can constitute a 
system that backs away from danger or instability, but not one that seeks self-preservation, 
or positively values its surroundings. Barrett's argument poses serious problems for many 
contemporary autopoietic enactivists, who view (prescriptive) concern and care for one's well-
being as a fundamental property of cognition.  
 
Autopoietic enactivism, then, takes up the general project outlined in TEM and pursues it 
with a particular emphasis on the way in which cognitive structures emerge from 
interactive dynamics. Its most canonical instances supplement the Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenological inspiration of TEM with ideas from Hans Jonas’s phenomenology of life, 
and its associated deep continuity of life and mind. 
 
3.2 Sensorimotor Enactivism 
Sensorimotor enactivism is usually presented as a way of explaining the intentional and 
phenomenal characteristics of perceptual experience rather than a general account of the 
                                                     
11 See Villalobos and Ward (2016), Ward and Villalobos (2016) for critical discussion of the 
role of the ‘Jonasian inference’ in enactivist theorising. 
mind.12 It shares with TEM a conception of perception as an active exploration of the 
environment rather than the construction of an inner model that recovers information lost 
in sensory transduction, and thus shares Merleau-Pontian, Gibsonian and Brooksian roots 
with TEM and autopoietic enactivism. However, sensorimotor enactivism largely ignores 
or downplays the other theoretical principles associated with enactivism, such as the co-
production of organism and environment, emphases on biodynamics and a commitment to 
life/mind continuity. 
 
Sensorimotor enactivists propose to account for the content and character of perception by 
appealing to sensorimotor contingencies: patterns of dependence obtaining between perception 
and exploratory activity. One way of motivating sensorimotor enactivism is by reflecting on 
the limits of our visual sensitivity, such as the low fidelity of parafoveal vision, the blind 
spot in our visual field, and the fact that we can only see some of the parts of an object at a 
time. In addition, experiments on change and inattentional blindness (discussed in O’Regan 
and Noe 2001) appear to show that the brain does not explicitly model rich and uniform 
detail. Yet our visual experience is of a rich and continuous world of complete objects. How 
is this possible? Sensorimotor enactivists answer this question by appealing to two related 
facts that were also emphasised by Merleau-Ponty and Gibson. First, that perception is a 
process that unfolds over time, and second, that a mobile perceiver has some control over 
the way in which sensory stimulation unfolds. How can I see the whole tomato when I am 
only presented with its facing side? Because, answers the sensorimotor enactivist, I 
implicitly understand the regular and predictable ways in which exploratory movements 
would bring other aspects of the tomato into view. How can I experience the environment 
as rich and detailed given the limits of my sensory sensitivity? Because I understand the 
ways in which further details of the environment can be revealed through exploratory 
activity. 
 
O’Regan (1992) thus suggests that the world itself serves as an ‘outside’ memory; an 
external information store which can be accessed as needed through exploratory 
movements such as saccades. Developing this idea, Noë (2004) claims that vision is 
analogous to reading an online version of a newspaper. Rather than downloading the entire 
issue at once, your computer accesses each article only when called upon, saving bandwidth 
and ensuring you always see the most recent version of the article. Importantly, for 
practical purposes this is just like having the entire edition in front of you, since you have 
access to it ‘virtually’. Perception, he suggests, involves an analogously virtual access to 
environmental detail, though in a disanalogy with the newspaper case, Noë claims that 
perception is virtual ‘all the way in’, meaning perceptual experience does not break down 
into a locally represented and a merely virtual component, but depends in its entirety on the 
possession and exercise of the sensorimotor skills needed to access detail in the 
environment. In this way, sensorimotor enactivists endorse Brooks’ anti-representationalist 
design strategy of using the world as its own best model, emphasising skilful capacities for 
accessing information over the construction and manipulation of detailed internal models. 
 
One source of disagreement within sensorimotor enactivism concerns exactly how the 
sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) used to explain perception should be understood. 
O’Regan and Noë (2001) present SMCs as dependencies between subpersonal effector and 
sensor states. The phenomenal differences between sense modalities can be accounted for, 
they claim, by patterns determined by the differing physical characteristics of the sense 
organs, while phenomenal differences within sense modalities, e.g. between different colour 
                                                     
12 Key works in this camp include Hurley 1998; O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004, 2012; 
O’Regan 2011. 
qualities, can be accounted for by sensorimotor patterns determined in addition by the 
objects interacted with. Noë (2004) shifts his emphasis to the personal level, suggesting that 
perceptual phenomenology is determined by relations between possible movement and the 
ways objects are presented from a particular perspective. For example, the circular shape of 
a plate is perceived in virtue of an implicit understanding of the way in which its elliptical 
appearance changes as a perceiver moves around it. Other forms of sensorimotor enactivism 
(e.g. Hurley 1998, Hurley and Noë 2003) emphasise both kinds of SMCs for different 
explanatory purposes.13 
 
Because we often perceptually experience features with which we are not presently 
interacting or in sensory contact, sensorimotor enactivism usually claims that perception 
requires not only that patterns of sensorimotor dependence obtain, but also that perceivers 
have ‘knowledge’ (or ‘mastery’, or ‘understanding’) of them. Importantly, such ‘sensorimotor 
understanding’ is construed as implicit and practical, rather than explicit and propositional 
(see Hurley 1998 (ch.4), Noë 2004 (ch.6), Roberts 2010). Beyond this broad-brush 
characterization of the nature of sensorimotor understanding, however, there is little 
consensus about how this notion should be understood – and, as we will see below, some 
enactivists argue that this feature of the view should be dispensed with altogether. The 
uncertain role of knowledge in sensorimotor enactivism is reflected by the quite different 
ways it has been developed scientifically. While some have begun to flesh out the 
implementational details of sensorimotor perception by appealing to entirely non-
representational dynamical systems (e.g. Burhmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran 2013; Fultot 
2016), others have developed the approach in a more cognitivist framework, for example 
Seth (2014), who has combined it with a predictive processing account, or Maye and Engel 
(e.g. 2016) who have used a representational implementation of sensorimotor knowledge in 
robot control architectures.  
 
There is also disagreement about the scope of sensorimotor enactivism. Noë (2004, 2016) is 
clear that the while his version of the approach is intended to shed light on the character of 
perceptual experience, it is not intended as an account of consciousness more generally, in 
part because there are pre-requisites for consciousness that fall outside the scope of 
sensorimotor enactivism and are to be addressed by enactivism’s autopoietic variants. 
O’Regan (2011), by contrast, presents sensorimotor enactivism as a way of understanding 
consciousness more generally. Remaining in many respects indifferent to how perception is 
implemented, O’Regan suggests that the approach is not intended to explain the mechanics 
of perception, but the phenomenal qualities that feature in it. He moreover emphasises that 
the approach is also meant to explain the phenomenal difference between perception and 
others kinds of conscious and unconscious process. Perception is distinguished by 
bodiliness, the fact that sense inputs change when you move, insubordinateness, the fact 
that these changes are partly shaped by the environment, grabbiness, the fact one’s 
attention is automatically drawn to sudden changes in sense input, and richness, the fact 
that the environment contains rich detail. Other sensations, such as pain, can in part be 
accounted for, he suggests, by the fact they lack some of these features or share them but to 
different degrees. Aiming to account for the very existence of consciousness, O’Regan’s 
sensorimotor enactivism claims that perceptual consciouness requires the addition of 
cognitive access to what one perceives and a sense of ‘self’. Explicitly rejecting apparatuses 
like autonomy and normativity, O’Regan’s version of the approach claims that perception 
and consciousness so-construed could be instantiated by a machine without biological life, a 
topic addressed by Degenaar and O’Regan in their contribution to this volume. 
                                                     
13 See Ward (2016) for a reconstruction of the relationship between subpersonal and 
personal-level SMCs in Susan Hurley’s sensorimotor enactivism. 
 
The various forms of sensorimotor enactivism, then, share TEM’s commitment to 
understanding perception in terms of capacities for perceptually-guided activity. But 
whereas autopoietic enactivists aim to explain a wide variety of cognitive capacities in terms 
of the autopoietic and adaptive dynamics sketched above, sensorimotor enactivists usually 
restrict their focus to perceptual experience, which is to be explained by appeal to 
sensorimotor dynamics relating perception to action. And while autopoietic enactivists are 
often committed to a Jonas-inspired deep continuity between life and mind, and a 
conception of perceptible qualities as enacted, rather than existing independently of the 
perceiver’s activity, sensorimotor enactivists typically remain neutral on these 
phenomenological and metaphysical claims. 
 
3.3 Radical Enactivism 
The final brand of enactivism that has emerged since TEM’s appearance is Hutto and 
Myin’s radical enactivism, or REC (‘Radically Enactive Cognition’).14 As Hutto (this issue) 
emphasises, however, REC should be seen as an attempt to improve and unify anti-
representationalist approaches to cognition rather than as competing with autopoietic or 
sensorimotor enactivism. As presented in Hutto & Myin 2012, REC takes up the general 
enactivist project of rejecting cognitivism in favour of analysing minds in terms of dynamic 
patterns of adaptive environmental interactions. Like sensorimotor enactivism, REC does 
not commit itself to the phenomenological and metaphysical claims of autopoietic 
enactivism, such as strong life/mind continuity and the claim that perceptible qualities are 
enacted rather than perceiver-independent. 
 
As Hutto (this issue) puts it, REC aims to ‘cleanse, purify, strengthen and unify a whole set 
of anti-representational offerings’. These offerings include the varieties of enactivism 
sketched above, as well as work in dynamical systems theory, embodied robotics and 
Gibsonian psychology. According to REC, autopoietic and sensorimotor enactivism incur 
implicit commitments to the cognitivist doctrines they aim to supplant. Above, we noted 
that sensorimotor enactivists typically require that the sensorimotor contingencies linking 
perception to action must be implicitly known or understood in order to issue in genuine 
perception. Anti-representationalist critics of sensorimotor enactivism (e.g. Hutto & Myin 
2012, Chemero 2016) take issue with this requirement for two related reasons. First, that 
such a mediating role for sensorimotor understanding invites cognitivist analysis in terms 
of internal rules and representations of sensorimotor contingencies; second, that this 
overintellectualises perception, understanding it in terms of cognitively sophisticated 
capacities that are left unanalysed by sensorimotor enactivists. REC points to embodied 
robotics and dynamical systems modelling as worked examples of how intelligent behaviour 
can emerge in the absence of internal representations and mediating knowledge or 
understanding of the functioning of the system. 
 
REC also objects to (or at least heavily qualifies) autopoietic enactivism’s attempts to 
ground intentional relations to the environment in biodynamics – for example the claim, 
sketched above, that adaptive regulation of autopoietic dynamics constitutes a form of 
sense-making that enacts meaning and significance in the organism/environment 
relationship. The reason for this is tied to the particular way in which REC’s anti-
representationalism is motivated. Hutto & Myin (2012; see also Hutto 2011, Hutto & Satne, 
2015) emphasise the lack of progress in providing an acceptable naturalised theory of 
intentional content, claiming that our best current theories of how some state or process in 
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an organism can represent an environmental property or feature all appear to face 
insuperable difficulties. For example, ‘teleosemantic’ theories appeal to the evolutionary 
history of organisms and their constituent parts in order to specify the content of 
representational states. If a perceptual mechanism has been selected for in virtue of its 
capacity to detect nearby tigers and initiate a fleeing response, then it’s (action-oriented) 
content is something like: ‘Tiger; flee!’ A well-known problem for such views (e.g. Fodor 
1990) is that an organism’s evolutionary history can’t always be used to disambiguate 
between different descriptions of what its constituent mechanisms have been selected for; 
for example, between ‘tiger’ and ‘striped predator’. Whilst this kind of indeterminacy is 
irrelevant for natural selection, it appears damaging to the prospects of providing a theory 
of representational content.15 REC emphasises such worries about teleosemantics and other 
attempts to naturalise representation in its case against cognitivism, and thus construes the 
job of enactivist cognitive science as characterising active engagements of organism and 
environment that support a basic but contentless form of mindedness. REC can thus agree 
with the autopoietic enactivist’s contention that biodynamics underpin cognition, while 
disagreeing about the way in which those dynamics ground attributions of content (for 
example characterising a bacterium as aiming towards, or valuing, sucrose). 
 
In this way, REC agrees with standard critiques of teleosemantics that representational 
content is underdetermined by biological function. Nonetheless, Hutto and Myin argue that 
the evolutionary history of an organism’s capacities for adaptive interaction can ground a 
teleological relation between organism and environment – though one without determinate, 
propositionally specifiable content. Whilst such determinate content is an important part of 
the cognitive lives of mature humans – for example in exercising capacities for judging, 
reasoning, and perceiving – this determinacy is only possible in virtue of socially scaffolded 
practices for interpersonal understanding (Hutto 2008) and language use that bring with 
them an added layer of normative constraint that is a criterion for genuine content (Hutto & 
Satne 2015). The autopoietic enactivist’s mistake, according to REC, is to describe basic 
interactive capacities in terms that presuppose both a rich selective history and a complex 
sociocultural context. 
 
REC thus draws on the same intellectual lineage as the above varieties of enactivism, 
rejecting cognitivism in favour of an emphasis on interactive dynamics. It goes beyond 
autopoietic and sensorimotor enactivism in its scepticism about the propriety of 
representational or contentful talk in characterising these dynamics, and this scepticism 
motivates a distinction between ‘basic’ cognitive capacities grounded in adaptive 
sensorimotor interaction and the richer socioculturally scaffolded capacities characteristic of 
mature human cognition. REC thus aims to analyse cognition in terms of an interplay 
between the biological and sensorimotor dynamics emphasised by the above forms of 
enactivism (suitably purged of representationalist undertones) and social dynamics that 
bootstrap basic minds into the realm of contentful thought and experience. 
 
3.4 Enactivism’s Extended Family 
Finally, much influential work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science over the past 
25 years has focused on developing the currents that fed into TEM in ways that overlap 
with the forms of enactivism summarised above, but without identifying itself as ‘enactivist’. 
Views of the mind as embodied, embedded, extended, affective, or some combination of these, are 
members of the enactivist family at least in virtue of sharing important common ancestry. 
Attempting a taxonomy of the lines of research carried on under each of these banners is far 
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beyond the scope of our task here (see e.g. Rowlands 2010 and Shapiro 2010 for partial 
attempts). We can note, at least, that enactivist theories are committed to a specific 
conception of cognition as embodied insofar as they all ground cognition in capacities for 
dynamic interaction between organism and environment – something that is only possible 
for an embodied entity. In emphasising organism/environment interactions enactivists 
likewise commit themselves to a view of cognition as essentially embedded – to be explained 
not only by properties of the organism itself, but also by properties of its environment and 
its interactions with it. As we have seen above, different varieties of enactivism develop 
these themes in different ways, depending on the range of interactive dynamics to which 
they appeal. Autopoietic enactivists, for example, stress the way in which the fine details of 
an organism’s embodiment determine the particular cognitive structures and relations it 
enacts, while sensorimotor enactivists are interested in details of embodiment only insofar 
as such details shape dynamic relations between sensation and movement. REC, as just 
noted, suggests a particular view of the socioculturally scaffolded environment in which 
human cognition is essentially embedded, in a way that goes beyond its autopoietic and 
sensorimotor siblings. 
 
Beyond these commonalities, however, the relationship between enactivism and other E-
centric approaches to cognition is disputed. In particular, the view that cognition should 
sometimes be understood as extended – that is, as having a material substrate that includes 
portions of the environment as well as of the organism – enjoys an uneasy relationship with 
enactivism. Ironically, the hypothesis of extended cognition draws on the very same sources 
surveyed in section 1, marshalling evidence that cognition can depend on patterns of 
dynamic interaction between brain, body and environment in service of the claim that 
cognition can constitutively depend on these interactions as a whole, rather than just on 
their internal effects (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008). However, Wheeler (2008) 
argues that autopoietic enactivism’s appeal to biodynamics that create and maintain a stable 
boundary between organism environment locks the processes constitutive of cognition 
within that boundary. In his contribution to this special issue Wheeler focuses on the 
relationship between extended cognition and radical enactivism. Hutto et al (2014) argue 
that radical enactivism entails a form of extended cognition, since replacing a conception of 
cognition as essentially content-involving with the radical enactivist’s emphasis on patterns 
of scaffolded interaction removes the temptation to construe cognition as a primarily 
internal process that can, in appropriate cases, extend. Instead, a relational, environment-
implicating conception of the material basis of cognition becomes the default starting point. 
Wheeler, however, argues that this relational conception of cognition is in fact neutral as to 
the location of the material processes that explain cognitive capacities – these processes 
might be internally realised, but nonetheless crucially embedded within the environment-
implicating dynamics to which enactivists appeal. 
 
An alternative view of the relationship between enactivism and extended cognition is 
provided in Colombetti’s contribution to this issue.  Following Di Paolo (2009), Colombetti 
argues that the enactive framework permits the dynamic processes constitutive of life (and 
hence, for autopoietic enactivism, constitutive of cognition) to extend beyond the biological 
boundaries of an organism – as when, for example, aquatic insects breathe underwater by 
creating and exploiting trapped air bubbles. As we saw above, autopoietic enactivists hold 
that the biodynamics of life entail a primitive form of affectivity, in the form of a concern for 
persistence. Colombetti thus argues that an extended conception of life, cognition and 
affectivity are entailed together by autopoietic enactivism. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
As we’ve seen in this introduction, enactivism draws on many influential strands from 
philosophy and cognitive science. Whilst the various positions surveyed above, and 
explored in this special issue, each weave these strands together in slightly different ways, 
all are united by a common commitment to understanding cognition as rooted in our 
engaged, bodily lives. Taken together, we hope that the papers in this special issue provide a 
clearer picture both of what unites, and what divides the varieties of enactivism, and of the 
challenges that lie ahead as enactivism enters its mid-twenties.16 
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